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I. INTRODUCTION 
Heather Wiseman worked as a Wal-Mart sales floor associate for almost a 
year prior to her pregnancy.1 While pregnant, Wiseman experienced urinary tract 
 
* J.D., University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law, to be conferred May 2013; B.A., Sociology, 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2009. I would like to thank Professor Ruth Jones for generously making 
time to inspire, guide, and enrich the development of this Comment. I would also like to thank Andrew, my 
parents, Graham, and Leeza, for unwavering love, support, and encouragement. 
1. Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 
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and bladder infections.2 Her doctor advised her to consume more water 
throughout the day and instructed her to carry a water bottle while at work.3 Then 
the store changed its policy to specifically “prohibit non-cashier employees from 
carrying water bottles, and it told [Wiseman] to stop carrying one.”4 Wiseman’s 
infections returned due to lack of hydration, so she obtained a doctor’s note 
instructing Wal-Mart to allow Wiseman to carry a water bottle at work.5 Wal-
Mart rejected the note and subsequently Wiseman began working in the fitting 
room, where she was further restricted from accessing the store’s water 
fountains.6 
With no other option, Wiseman was forced to carry a water bottle again or 
else risk her health and that of her child.7 As a result, Wal-Mart terminated 
Wiseman’s employment for “insubordination.”8 Wiseman brought a suit against 
Wal-Mart.9 Unfortunately, under existing law, Wal-Mart was within their legal 
rights to take such action.10 Wiseman’s claims under the Family Medical Leave 
Act (FMLA)11 and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)12 were insufficient to 
provide a remedy.13 
Enacted in 1978, the PDA amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with the 
purpose of eliminating employment decisions based on pregnancy and promoting 
workplace equality for women affected by pregnancy.14 Unfortunately, under the 
structural parameters of the PDA, pregnant women are judged by exactly the 
same standards as both non-pregnant women and men.15 While this pregnancy-








7. See id. (stating that her infections “reoccurred due to a lack of hydration”). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. See infra note 13 (describing the court’s reasoning in rejecting Wiseman’s claim). 
11. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, (k). 
13. The court rejected Wiseman’s FMLA claim because her complaint failed to meet the requisite 
number of hours worked and she did not allege either one of the two FMLA causes of action: retaliation or 
interference. Wiseman, 2009 WL 1617669 at *2 (describing why neither cause of action applies to Wiseman’s 
case). Additionally, although the court did not address Wiseman’s pregnancy discrimination claim, it likely 
would have failed due to the current state of the law and its focus on a comparison approach. See infra Part 
IV.A (explaining the PDA’s comparison-based approach for evaluating discrimination claims). 
14. 124 CONG. REC. 11839, 21435–37 (1978) [hereinafter CONG. REC.]. 
15. Id. (Pregnant women “shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other 
persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . .”). 
16. CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21436–37. “Desirable” pregnancy-blind treatment refers to the 
specific discrimination the PDA intended to eliminate—discrimination on the basis of pregnancy resulting in 
adverse employment actions based solely on this condition. Id. For instance, it is desirable for an employer to 
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effects, even healthy pregnancies may affect a woman’s ability to work.17 This is 
because a completely symptom-free pregnancy does not exist based on the very 
nature of pregnancy.18 Moreover, women experience conditions related to their 
reproductive capacities, which courts have found fall outside the scope of the 
PDA.19 Therefore, women’s reproductive capacities present unique conditions 
requiring accommodation in order to allow women to achieve these equal 
employment opportunities. 
The female’s unique anatomy is essential to reproductive ability.20 Women 
bear the physical burdens of reproductive choices between couples. First, women 
alone experience the physical bodily changes that occur during pregnancy. 
Likewise, if infertility treatments are involved, the woman most often 
experiences the higher health risks and side effects.21 
Issues involving pregnancy in the workplace will likely become more 
prevalent as more women decide to work.22 As of 2010, women, in general, 
comprised forty-seven percent of the total labor force.23 According to the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, eighty percent of working women will become pregnant 
during their working lives.24 These statistics show the high rate of participation of 
women in the workforce who will be affected by their unique reproductive 
capacity. 
“Equal employment opportunity” focuses on an individual’s right not to be 
discriminated against by an employer (or potential employer) based on one of the 
several specifically enumerated protected characteristics.25 “Equal Employment 
Opportunity is a principle that asserts that all people should have the right to 
work and advance on the bases of merit and ability, regardless of their race, sex, 
 
overlook a woman’s pregnancy in making a hiring decision when the woman is capable of work. Id. 
17. See infra Part V.A (listing the side effects that occur with all pregnancies, such as hormonal changes 
and fetal movement). 
18. Id. 
19. See infra Part IV.B (identifying the PDA’s failure to cover biologically related functions and 
physiological effects of pregnancy). 
20. Female Reproductive System, EDUCATION.COM, http://www.education.com/reference/article/Ref_ 
Female_Reproductive/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (detailing the unique 
aspects of the female reproductive system, which facilitate pregnancy). 
21. See infra Part IV.B.2 (detailing the higher risks of infertility treatments for women in comparison to 
men). 
22. See Stephanie Armour, Pregnant Workers Report Growing Discrimination, USA TODAY (Feb. 16, 
2005, 9:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/workplace/2005-02-16-pregnancy-bias-usat_x.htm (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review) (“The rise in pregnancy discrimination cases is important now because more 
women of child-bearing age are in the labor force . . . .”). 
23. Women in the Labor Force in 2010, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., http://www.dol.gov/wb/factsheets/Qf-
laborforce-10.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
24. Pregnancy in the Workplace, INC., http://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/pregnancy-in-the-workplace 
.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
25. See Overview, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the role of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission in enforcing laws prohibiting such discrimination). 
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color, religion, disability, national origin, or age.”26 Better protection, in the form 
of reasonable accommodations for reproductive capacity, will expand the 
opportunities for women to remain in the workforce. 
The PDA, as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,27 follows a comparison 
framework in evaluating discrimination claims.28 Courts look for “equal 
treatment”29 based on an evaluation of whether the employee claiming 
discrimination was treated less favorably in comparison to another employee who 
is “similarly situated” but for the particular characteristic that is the basis of the 
discrimination claim.30 Under this theory, pregnant women are viewed as 
indistinguishable from others in a similarly situated class, or individuals “similar 
to the complainant in all respects but for the protected characteristic.”31  
Men and women should be allowed to compete freely and on an equal basis 
in the workplace; however, current laws do not promote this idea because they do 
not take into account the reality that women uniquely experience the physical 
side effects of pregnancy. The PDA does not provide adequate protection, due to 
its limited coverage of the effects of gestation and birth, as well as its enactment 
as an amendment to Title VII (which focuses on comparison to a similarly 
situated class). This Comment argues for a federal law that requires employers to 
provide reasonable accommodations for employees who experience conditions 
related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related reproductive conditions. 
Part II begins with the social context of employment discrimination against 
women, which led to the need for equal employment laws. Part III provides an 
overview of the case law leading up to the need for the PDA and a brief 
description of the PDA’s enactment, structure, and effect. Part IV addresses 
specific ways in which the PDA insufficiently protects women due to the Act’s 
comparator-based approach. Finally, Part V discusses the necessity of a new law 
 
26. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, CDC EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY, http://www.cdc. 
gov/diversity/equalopportunity/index.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2010) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006). Title VII prohibits employers from making hiring or firing decisions or 
otherwise discriminating against individuals based on their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”; or 
otherwise adversely affect their employment status based on these characteristics. Id. § 2000e-2.  
28. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 763 (2011) (“[C]ourts 
have transformed the comparator methodology into the substantive law of discrimination.”). 
29. Nicholas Smith, A Critique of Recent Approaches to Discrimination Law, 2007 N.Z. LAW REV. 499, 
504 (2007). 
30. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 613 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
31. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 731, 759 (citing to Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734 (7th 
Cir. 1994)). In Troupe, the plaintiff was fired for tardiness due to morning sickness and was unable to prevail in 
her case for failure to provide an example of a similarly situated class. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 735. The court held 
that the PDA does not require employers to make it any easier for pregnant women to work than it is for their 
similarly situated co-workers. Id. at 738. Judge Posner explained that a similarly situated class would consist of 
a male who was as tardy as the plaintiff due to health problems and about to take a paid sick leave as a result of 
those problems. Id. As this case demonstrates, the possibility of a plaintiff finding a similarly situated class 
against which to compare her situation presents a difficult task. But see id. at 739 (“We doubt that finding a 
comparison group would be that difficult.”). 
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that recognizes an accommodation approach rather than a comparative approach 
to women’s reproductive functions. This Part utilizes the Americans with 
Disabilities Act as a model of a currently existing law that requires 
accommodations for employees with certain conditions, which are very similar in 
effect to pregnancy and related reproductive functions.32 In addition, this Part 
refers to current California law33 for a specific example of a pregnancy 
accommodation law, which may be modified in order to apply on the federal 
level. 
II. HISTORY OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 
Section A provides the historical backdrop of women in the workplace 
beginning in the early twentieth century. This Section details women’s entrance 
into the workforce and the important implications that resulted. More 
specifically, this Section traces the growing need and expectation of equality for 
women especially with respect to employment opportunities. Section B describes 
the enactment of Title VII and reveals the sexism involved in the drafting of this 
landmark law.  
A.  Women in the Workforce Prior to Title VII 
In the early twentieth century, women worked predominantly in the home, 
while some participated in the labor force.34 The dominant social view at the time 
was that women should stay “within the home as wives and mothers.”35 Even 
when women did participate in the workforce, their presence remained “limited 
by cultural beliefs [and] social practices . . . that subordinated women to men.”36 
As a class, women earned noticeably lower wages than men and filled the lower-
paying occupations.37 Women were also subjected to harsh and unsafe working 
conditions38 at much lower rates than men, as a result of this perceived 
 
32. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011) (defining “disability” in the ADA regulations as “[a] physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits . . . manual tasks . . . eating, sleeping, walking, standing, . . . lifting, 
bending, . . . breathing, . . . concentrating, thinking, . . . and working.”). 
33. CAL. GOV’T CODE §12945 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012). 
34. A History of Women in Industry, NAT’L WOMEN’S HIST. MUSEUM 7, http://www.nwhm.org/online-
exhibits/industry/womenindustry_intro.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review). Readers of this historical account of women in the workforce should note that lower class African-
American and immigrant women already worked outside of their home as a matter of economic necessity and 
socially mandated conditions. See id. (“At the end of the 19th century, most women workers were non-white.”).  
35. Id. at 1. 
36. Jeanne Boydston, Women in the Labor Force, AM. NAT’L BIOGRAPHY ONLINE, http://www.anb.org/ 
cush_wlabor.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
37. Id. While the wage gap between women and men has been slowly increasing, women still earned 
23% less than men in 2010. A Brief History of Pay Inequity, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, http://www.aauw. 
org/act/laf/library/payequity_hist.cfm (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
38. A History of Women in Industry, supra note 34, at 9 “[W]omen typically worked 12 to 14 hours, 7 
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inferiority.39 On average, women’s wages amounted to a mere sixty percent of 
that earned by men.40 
Employment conditions remained dismal and employment discrimination 
against women persisted even as women increasingly entered the labor force.41 
According to the National Women’s History Museum, as women increasingly 
left the home to join the paid workforce, they experienced heavy criticism and 
discrimination.42 More specifically, during the Great Depression, the American 
public viewed working women as stealing potential jobs from men.43 The media 
also attacked working women for “abandoning their families,”44 thus, reinforcing 
the notion of women’s roles as homemaker first and worker second.45 Laws that 
preferred men to women also perpetuated the discrimination.46 Consequently, 




During World War II, many men left to serve in the armed forces, which 
resulted in a labor shortage.48 Responding to this shortage, women began 
performing traditionally male-held jobs in factories and on production lines.49 
Although many women were terminated after the war ended and men returned 
home, “there were lasting effects” of women’s participation in traditionally male-
held jobs.50 Women were inspired by a belief in their right to receive fair working 
conditions.51 “Women had proven that they could do the job and within a few 
decades, women in the workforce became a common sight.”52 
 
days a week at a sewing machine in a factory without central heating, electricity, or ventilation.” Id. As a result 
of the conditions, “women often suffered from serious workplace injuries . . . and contagious illnesses that 
spread quickly . . . in the cramped factories.” Id. 
39. See id. at 7. 
40. Id. 
41. See id. (referring to women’s consistently lower wages and poor working conditions). 
42. Id. at 14. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. See id. (referring to the media’s backlash against women for leaving the home and entering the 
workforce). 
46. For instance, Congress enacted the Federal Economy Act, which excluded “a married woman from 
working in civil service if her husband did as well.” Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Women in the Work Force During World War II, NAT’L ARCHIVES, http://www.archives.gov/south 




51. A History of Women in Industry, supra note 34, at 8. 
52. Women in the Work Force During World War II, supra note 48. 
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B.  The Enactment of Title VII 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to achieve equal 
employment opportunities for individuals with certain specifically protected 
characteristics.53 The characteristics protected under Title VII include “race, 
color, religion, sex, [and] national origin.”54 Title VII explicitly prohibits 
employers from discriminating “because of” or “on the basis of” these 
enumerated characteristics.55 
Many viewed the addition of “a sex discrimination provision to Title VII as 
little more than a ‘joke’ or a political ploy.”56 As one court noted: “The sex 
discrimination prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil 
rights opponent Howard W. Smith.”57 Conservative civil rights opponents such as 
Smith believed that the inclusion of sex as a protected characteristic would result 
in the bill’s defeat.58 The manner in which sex discrimination became a part of 
Title VII corroborates the long struggle women have faced in achieving equal 
employment opportunities.59 
III. THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT 
Section A explains the employment conditions for pregnant working women 
in the period of time after the 1964 enactment of Title VII. Section B describes 
Congress’s clarification to Title VII with its 1978 enactment of the PDA.  
A.  Pre-Pregnancy Discrimination Act 
Even after Congress enacted Title VII, women continued to be deprived of 
equal employment opportunities because employers regularly discriminated 
based on pregnancy.60 Employers considered pregnancy in making employment 
 
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2006) (providing for the establishment of the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission). 
54. Id. § 2000e-2. 
55. Id. 
56. Robert C. Bird, More than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex 
Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137 (1997) (citing Rabidue v. 
Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). 
57. Id. at 137 n.4 (quoting Rabidue, 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36). 
58. Id. (citing Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve Equality in the Workplace? 
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 409 n.62 (1996)). 
59. But see Epstein, supra note 58, at 409 n.62 (arguing that passage of the item demonstrates the 
perceived merit of protecting against sex discrimination); Bird, supra note 56, at 138 (“Congress added sex as a 
result of subtle political pressure from individuals, who for varying reasons, were serious about protecting the 
rights of women.”). 
60. See CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 11839 (indicating that a significant number of employers force 
women to stop working even when they are able to continue, and citing many employers’ imposition of an 
arbitrary date to return to work “based on the stereotypical notions that women are unable to continue working 
08_OYOUNG_VER_01_7-20-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 10:17 AM 
2013 / Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace  
522 
decisions such as hiring, firing, and wage determinations.61 Employers also 
terminated employment or forced women to take mandatory maternity leave at 
arbitrary points in their pregnancy.62 Many pregnant women were forced to take 
mandatory maternity leave despite their capability and desire to continue 
working.63 For example, General Electric required pregnant women to take leave 
“three months prior to birth and [they were] not permitted to return until six 
weeks after the birth.”64 Further revealing the discriminatory practices against 
pregnant women, this policy of mandatory leave despite physical ability to work 
was not applied to any other employees—just pregnant women.65 
In response to the continuing discrimination against pregnant women, 
women began bringing actions against their employers.66 In 1974, the United 
States Supreme Court decided Geduldig v. Aiello.67 This was the first time the 
Court addressed whether discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is 
unconstitutional gender discrimination.68 
In Geduldig, California’s disability insurance system excluded coverage for 
disabilities caused by pregnancy.69 Plaintiffs, four women denied disability 
benefits due to pregnancy complications, challenged California’s disability 
insurance program as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution.70 Under the applicable 
constitutional law of the time, the plaintiffs bore the burden of “showing that 
distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an 
invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other.”71 If 
plaintiffs could not meet this burden, pregnancy could be excluded from 
insurance coverage “on any reasonable basis . . . .”72 
 
or do not desire to return to work”). 
61. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 149–50 n.1 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(indicating General Electric’s decision to pay lower wages to women based on pregnancy and “other 
considerations”); see also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 634–36 (1974) (forcing pregnant 
employees to take mandatory maternity leave at the beginning of their fifth month despite their willingness and 
ability to continue working). 
62. CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21435; Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 149–50 n.1. 
63. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 414 U.S. at 636. 
64. Gen. Elec. Co., 429 U.S. at 149–50 n.1. 
65. Id. 
66. See Sandra Pullman, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU (Mar. 7, 
2006), http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff (last visited July 5, 
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the numerous gender discrimination lawsuits leading up 
to the enactment of the PDA). 
67. 417 U.S. 484, 496–97 (1976). 
68. Diane L. Zimmerman, Geduldig v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex 
Discrimination, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 441, 442 (1975). 
69. 417 U.S. at 486. 
70. Id. at 486 n.20, 487. 
71. Id. at 496 n.20. 
72. Id.  
08_OYOUNG_VER_01_7-20-12_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2013 10:17 AM 
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44 
523 
The Court held that the policy’s exclusion of pregnancy disability benefits 
did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it did not involve 
discrimination against a definable protected group; the policy only discriminated 
against pregnant women rather than all women.73 While recognizing that only 
women become pregnant, it reasoned that the insurance program drew a 
distinction between “pregnant women” and “nonpregnant persons.”74 “The 
California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility 
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition—pregnancy—
from the list of compensable disabilities.”75 
The Court concluded that “[t]here is no risk from which men are protected 
and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk from which women are protected 
and men are not.”76 In support, the Court noted that, “[w]hile [pregnant persons 
are] exclusively female, the [category of nonpregnant persons] includes members 
of both sexes.”77 In order to reach this conclusion, the court relied on a 
categorization of “pregnant” versus “nonpregnant persons.”78 It then compared 
these two groups and found that women also fall into both the “pregnant” and 
“nonpregnant” categories, thus no gender discrimination occurred.79 By 
categorizing the groups for comparison, the designation of pregnant or non-
pregnant persons allowed employers to make decisions based on pregnancy.80 
Notably, Geduldig did not create an immediate need to address pregnancy 
discrimination under Title VII because it was brought as a constitutional Equal 
Protection case and not a Title VII action.81 The need to examine pregnancy 
discrimination under Title VII soon arose; in 1976, the Supreme Court relied on 
the Geduldig interpretation of non-pregnant persons in deciding General Electric 
Co. v. Gilbert.82 
In General Electric Co., employees sued as a class because the company’s 
insurance plan excluded coverage of pregnancy-related disabilities, while 
covering other non-occupational situations such as vasectomies, cosmetic 
surgeries, and sports-related injuries.83 The class members alleged that excluding  
 
73. Id. at 497. 
74. Id. at 496 n.20. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 484. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 496 n.20. 
79. Id. 
80. See Ann C. Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND. L. REV. 375, 380 (1981) (quoting L. 
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16–27, at 1071 (1978)) (“Thus, under Geduldig, ‘the link of the 
excluded disability [due to pregnancy] was to be treated as essentially coincidental.’”). 
81. Decisional Background of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Employment Discrimination (MB) 3-
47, at § 47.02 (2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
82. 429 U.S. 125, 133–34 (citing Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 484). 
83. Id. at 127, 151–52.  
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pregnancy coverage constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title VII’s 
prohibition against gender discrimination.84 
The Court rejected this argument and held that exclusion of pregnancy from 
insurance coverage does not constitute sex discrimination under Title VII.85 It 
explained that a “prima facie violation of Title VII can be established in some 
circumstances upon proof that the effect of an otherwise facially neutral plan or 
classification is to discriminate against members of one class or another.”86 The 
Court’s holding was based on the Geduldig “nonpregnant persons” distinction in 
order to assert that exclusion of pregnancy “is not a gender-based discrimination 
at all,”87 and, thus, the class of women was not specifically discriminated 
against.88 The majority noted that the financial benefits of the plan paid out 
equally to men and women.89 It further justified non-coverage by distinguishing 
pregnancy from other covered diseases and disabilities by classifying pregnancy 
as a “voluntarily undertaken and desired condition.”90 Despite Title VII, the 
General Electric Co. ruling permitted sex discrimination, which allowed unfair 
treatment based on pregnancy—a uniquely female reproductive function.91 
B.  Enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 
Congress enacted the PDA as an amendment to Title VII in direct response to 
the Court’s ruling in General Electric Co.92 The law explicitly states that under 
Title VII, discrimination “‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’” also includes 
circumstances that occur “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or 
related medical conditions.”93 Furthermore, the PDA states that women affected 
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions “shall be treated the same 
for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe 
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or 
inability to work . . . .”94 
 
84. Id. at 129. 
85. Id. at 145–46. 
86. Id. at 137. 
87. Id. at 136. 
88. Id. at 145–46. 
89. Id. at 139 n.17. 
90. Id. at 136. 
91. Id. at 145–46. 
92. See generally CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21435–36 (multiple speakers stating that General 
Electric Co. necessitates clarification that Congress intended discrimination on the basis of sex to include 
pregnancy discrimination); see also id. at 34292–94 (including an article in the record titled “General Electric 
Company v. Gilbert: The Plight of the Working Woman”). 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2006). 
94. Id. 
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Despite Congress’s stated intention of alleviating employment discrimination 
on the basis of pregnancy,95 the PDA is insufficient to provide equal employment 
opportunities to women. This insufficiency arises because the PDA does not 
cover certain reproductive conditions that women experience and it applies a 
comparative analysis in evaluating discrimination claims.96 In addition, the PDA 
only addresses pregnancy discrimination and, thus, fails to address the situation 
in which reasonable accommodations would allow a woman to continue her 
employment, despite her unique reproductive capacity.97 
IV. INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PDA 
This Part will explain in more detail the application of the comparator 
approach in order to argue that the PDA provides inadequate protection. 
A.  The Comparator Approach Fails to Adequately Address Women’s 
Reproductive Capacity 
The PDA utilizes a comparator-based analysis, which requires a plaintiff to 
identify a similarly situated non-pregnant individual who received better 
treatment.98 An employer may deny accommodations for pregnancy and still 
comply with the PDA if their actions result in “treat[ing] nonpregnant employees 
the same as pregnant employees.”99 Since employers are only required to 
recognize women’s reproductive capacities to the extent that they accommodate 
other conditions,100 this allows an employer to treat all employees poorly and 
never accommodate reproductive capacities.101 While this may seem fair initially, 
when considering that only women will ever experience the consequences of 
 
95. In enacting Title VII’s PDA, Congress wanted to “insure that genuine equality in the American labor 
force is more than an illusion and that pregnancy will no longer be the basis of unfavorable treatment of 
working women.” CONG. REC., supra note 14, at 21435–37 (statement of Representative Augustus F. Hawkins). 
96. See infra Part IV (detailing the insufficiencies of the PDA). 
97. For instance, Heather Wiseman could have carried her own water bottle at no cost to the employer. 
This would have allowed her to continue working and productively contributing to the labor force. Wiseman v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009). 
98. Goldberg, supra note 28. 
99. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548 (7th Cir. 2011). In Serednyj, the 
employer denied providing temporary accommodations for all non-work related injuries. Id. at 545–47. Since 
the policy distinguished between work-related and non-work related injuries, they were allowed to classify 
pregnancy as non-work related. Id. at 548. The court found that this policy treated non-pregnant employees the 
same as pregnant employees and was, thus, permissible under the PDA. Id. at 552. 
100. See Facts About Pregnancy Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/fs-preg.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2013) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(explaining that an employer must treat an employee with pregnancy disabilities the same as it would treat any 
other temporarily disabled employee).  
101. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (“The Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act does not . . . require employers to offer maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier 
for pregnant women to work . . . .”).  
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their unique reproductive capacity, it becomes clear that the current state of the 
law can systematically prevent women, as a class, from achieving equal 
employment opportunities. 
A major problem with current law is that there is no similarly situated class 
to pregnant women.102 In pregnancy and female reproductive issues, “there can be 
no precise comparator by reason of the different reproductive capacities of men 
and women . . . .”103 Because symptoms and conditions vary among pregnant 
women, and even between pregnancies for the same woman,104 finding a similarly 
situated non-pregnant person is often not possible.105 
Many legitimate pregnancy discrimination claims fail due to the inability to 
find a legally acceptable comparator.106 Even when a woman may continue 
working with the aid of a temporary accommodation, an employer may terminate 
her employment if they do not already provide accommodations to similarly 
situated employees.107 As such, pregnant women may face a difficult choice 
between remaining in the workforce and receiving equal employment 
opportunities or leaving the workforce in order to protect their health or the 
health of their children. Sadly, pregnant women who are capable of continuing 
work if provided a reasonable accommodation may instead be fired.108 
 
102. Janna L. Grossman, The Pregnant Workers’ Fairness Act: Accommodating the Needs of Pregnant 
Working Women, JUSTIA (May 11, 2012), http://verdict.justia.com/2012/05/11/the-pregnant-workers-fairness-
act (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
103. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 761. 
104. See infra Part V.A (providing examples of different symptoms that are not experienced by all 
pregnant women). 
105. See Grossman, supra note 102 (noting that courts have not accepted comparisons to “employees 
who receive accommodations mandated by the [ADA]”).  
106. See Goldberg, supra note 28, at 735 (arguing that many forms of discrimination are not heard due 
to the rare existence of a “sufficiently close comparator”). 
107. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that the PDA does 
not require employers to make it any easier for pregnant women to work than it is for their similarly situated co-
workers). Judge Posner explained that a similarly situated class would consist of a male plaintiff whose health 
problems caused him to be as late and about to take a paid sick leave as a result of those problems. Id. at 738; 
see also Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2011). In Serednyj, the court 
rejected the plaintiff’s proposed comparators and found her PDA claim insufficient. Id. at 548–52. For instance, 
one woman suffered disc degeneration in her back and took two leaves of absence to recover. Id. at 551. That 
woman had taken FMLA leave, which Serednyj did not qualify for because she had not worked at Beverly long 
enough. Id. at 546. The court also rejected comparison to Pam Seibert, a speech therapist who required frequent 
breaks due to a medical condition. Id. at 552. Seibert was not considered a proper comparator because she was 
hired as an independent contractor rather than a direct employee of Beverly. Id. Gina Sizemore, a pregnant 
woman fired for not being able to return to full working capacity upon returning from FMLA leave, presented 
another rejected comparator because the court found that this case showed Beverly applying its modified work 
policy uniformly. Id. This uniform application of the modified work policy results in permitting systematic 
exclusion of pregnant women requiring accommodations from the workplace.  
108. See Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, No. 2:08-CV-4 RM, 2010 WL 1568606, at *1 (N.D. Ind. 
Apr. 16, 2010). Rearranging tables and transporting residents to and from activities, the tasks for which the 
plaintiff needed accommodation, each required five to ten minutes per day. Id. at *1. In addition, although her 
co-workers already assisted her with these activities prior to pregnancy and the only necessary accommodation 
required was the formality of stating that other co-workers must help her in these tasks, the employer was still 
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B.  Non-Coverage of Biologically Related Functions and Physiological Effects 
As the PDA only addresses gestation and birth, many biologically related 
functions and physiological effects of a woman’s reproductive capacity are not 
covered under existing law. Due to these limitations, federal courts repeatedly 
deny discrimination claims involving breastfeeding and fertility treatments that 
plaintiffs bring under the PDA.109 The achievement of equal employment 
opportunities for women demands accommodation of these uniquely female 
conditions, which can interfere with a woman’s ability to compete on an equal 
basis. If provided with reasonable accommodations, many women affected by 
their unique reproductive capacity may continue working at productive levels.110 
1.  Breastfeeding 
Although the production of breast milk is directly related to pregnancy and 
women’s unique reproductive capacities, the PDA does not require employers to 
accommodate lactation.111 Women’s bodies begin producing breast milk during 
pregnancy.112 In addition, the body produces the hormone oxytocin in direct 
response to the birth of the baby,113 triggering the lactation process.114 Therefore, 
the production of breast milk is directly linked to pregnancy.115 Despite these 
obvious connections between pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation, many courts 
 
within its legal rights under the PDA to refuse accommodation and fire her. Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 551–52.  
In addition, it is arguably in the employer’s best interest to provide reasonable accommodations. 
Reasonable accommodations will maintain worker satisfaction and team morale, reduce turnover rates, and cut 
the time and monetary costs of hiring and training new employees. See The Business Case for Breastfeeding: 
Steps for Creating a Breastfeeding Friendly Worksite, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HEALTH RES., & 
SERVS. ADMIN., http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/government-in-action/business-case-for-breast 
feeding/business-case-for-breastfeeding-for-business-managers.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (describing how accommodating breastfeeding actually saves employers money). 
109. See infra Part IV.B.1–2 (providing case examples). 
110. For instance, an employee who needs a regular water supply and, thus, requires an accommodation 
that allows her to carry a water bottle, does not present a significant (if any) reduction in her productivity level. 
Wiseman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 08-1244-EFM, 2009 WL 1617669, at *1 (D. Kan. June 9, 2009). 
111. For cases holding that breastfeeding or breast-pumping and lactation do not fall under the coverage 
of the PDA, see E.E.O.C. v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., No. H-11-2442, 2012 WL 739494, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 
2, 2012); Martinez v. N.B.C. Inc., 49 F. Supp. 2d 305, 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc. 960 
F. Supp. 1487, 1491 (D. Colo. 1997); McNill v. New York, 950 F. Supp. 564, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Wallace v. 
Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990). 
112. Breastfeeding: Overview, AM. PREGNANCY ASS’N, http://www.americanpregnancy.org/firstyearof 
life/breastfeedingoverview.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
113. Definition of Lactation, MEDICINENET.COM, http://www.medterms.com/script/main/art.asp?article 
key=6202 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
114. Id. 
115. See supra notes 112–14 (demonstrating the clear link between pregnancy and the production of 
breast milk). 
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hold that the PDA does not apply to workplace discrimination based on 
breastfeeding.116 
In McNill v. New York Department of Correction, the plaintiff’s child was 
born with a cleft palate and lip, which required breast-feeding as opposed to 
bottle-feeding prior to the corrective surgery and for several weeks thereafter 
during the healing process.117 As the only individual capable of fulfilling her 
child’s medical needs,118 the plaintiff could not return to work at the originally 
agreed-upon date.119 In finding that breastfeeding is not a medical condition 
related to pregnancy, the court reasoned that the PDA protects the mother against 
discrimination, but not the child.120 This reasoning forced McNill to choose 
between keeping her job and fulfilling her child’s medical needs.121 This case 
demonstrates a situation in which the woman’s unique reproductive capacity 
resulted in the loss of her job.122 While McNill presents a presumably rare case, it 
 
116. See, e.g., Martinez, 49 F. Supp. 2d. at 310; Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869; McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 
571; Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at 1491; Houston Funding II, Ltd., 2012 WL 739494, at *1 (all holding that 
breastfeeding or breast-pumping and lactation do not fall under the coverage of the PDA). While women may 
choose not to breastfeed, based on the extensive medical studies and advisories, breastfeeding is the most 
beneficial option for a child. See The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Support Breastfeeding, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/topics/breastfeeding/factsheet.html (last visited 
Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Why Breastfeeding Is Important, 
WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://www.womenshealth.gov/breastfeeding/why-breastfeeding-is-important/ (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Benefits of Breastfeeding, NATURAL RES. DEF. 
COUNCIL, http://www.nrdc.org/breastmilk/benefits.asp (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (all explicitly stating that breastfeeding provides far better health benefits than formula for both 
mother and child). Therefore, this Comment argues that breastfeeding is really not a choice for a woman. When 
a couple decides to give their child the best possible nourishment via breast milk, it is always a woman who 
must bear any adverse employment effects of that joint decision. 
117. 950 F. Supp. at 571. 
118. It may be argued that McNill could have used a wet nurse. However, the risks likely outweigh the 
benefits of this solution. Milk Donations, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L, http://www.llli.org/llleaderweb/lv/ 
lvjulaug95p53.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). A wet nurse is 
beneficial because McNill could continue working without requiring breastfeeding accommodations. Id. 
However, risks may include transmission of bacteria or viruses, “some of which may be found in milk 
expressed by asymptomatic women.” Id. Babies also require different compositions of breast milk depending on 
their age. Id. The biological mother’s breast milk provides the exact composition the child requires, whereas 
breast milk from a woman with a child of a different age does not. Id. 
An additional burden of hiring a wet nurse is the cost. Wet nurse rates start at $1,000 per week according 
to Robert Feinstock, an owner of a nationwide wet nurse agency. Jeninne Lee-St. John, Outsourcing Breast 
Milk, TIME MAG. U.S. (Apr. 19, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1612710,00.html 
(citing an interview with Robert Feinstock) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
Although accommodating breastfeeding requires costs to the employer, these costs are very small and 
pale in comparison to the risks and monetary expense of hiring a wet nurse when the mother is fully capable of 
supplying her own breast milk. See infra Part IV.B.1 (detailing the minimal requirements to accommodate 
breastfeeding). 
119. McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 566. 
120. Id. at 571; see also Fejes, 960 F. Supp. at 1487 (“[N]eeds or conditions of the child which require 
the mother’s presence are not within the scope of the PDA.”). 
121. See McNill, 950 F. Supp. at 571. 
122. Id. at 568 (detailing McNill’s demotion and reinstatement upon return to an inferior post). 
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nonetheless shows that the lack of accommodation for a woman’s unique 
reproductive capacity affected her ability to remain in the workforce and to 
compete on an equal basis.123 
Lactation may also cause great discomfort and pain and, without reasonable 
accommodations, may interfere with a woman’s ability to work. Women often 
experience uncomfortable swelling, heaviness, hardness, and leakage as a result 
of lactation.124 Lactation and continued breastfeeding also provide significant 
health and financial benefits to both mother and child.125 Once again, a woman 
should not be forced to choose between maintaining her health, or her child’s, 
and obtaining equal employment opportunities. Periodic pumping breaks and a 
private area to breastfeed are prime examples of reasonable accommodations that 
will give women the opportunity to remain in the workforce and continue to 
compete on an equal basis. 
The Obama administration recently signed the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act,126 which includes an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards 
Act of 1938.127 This amendment requires an employer to provide reasonable 
break time for a woman to pump her breast milk for one year after the birth of 
her child.128 It also requires the employer to provide a private place to pump.129 
However, if an employer maintains less than fifty employees, it is exempt from 
this requirement if doing so would “impose an undue hardship . . . when 
considered in relation to the size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the 
employer’s business.”130 While this new law improves equal employment 
opportunities for some women, a large number of women working for smaller 
employers will not receive these accommodations.131 In addition, the law does not 
address workplace discrimination against women due to lactation, nor does it 
apply to non-exempt employees.132 As a result, women may still have to choose 
 
123. Id. at 573. 
124. Diana Kasdan, Reclaiming Title VII and the PDA: Prohibiting Workplace Discrimination Against 
Breastfeeding Women, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 309, 313 (2001) (citing Chapman et. al, Identification of Risk Factors 
for Delayed Onset of Lactation, 99 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS’N 450 (1999)). 
125. See The Surgeon General’s Call to Action to Support Breastfeeding, supra note 116 (providing 
comprehensive overview of the benefits of breastfeeding to mother, child, and employer). Breastfeeding helps 
reduce the woman’s risk of breast and ovarian cancer, and also provides crucial immune support to the child. Id. 
In addition, breastfeeding can save up to $1,500 on formula in the first year as well as reduce the frequency of 
illnesses and, thus, medical expenses. Id.  
126. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010) (enacted). 
127. 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2006). 
128. Id. § 207(r)(1)(A). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. § 207(r)(3). 
131. See id. (allowing employers of less than fifty to invoke an “undue hardship” defense and creating a 
possible lack of accommodation for breastfeeding women working for small employers). 
132. See Help Working Families Stay Healthy: Support Breastfeeding Mothers in the Workplace, U.S. 
BREASTFEEDING COMM., http://www.usbreastfeeding.org/Portals/0/Advocacy/2011-BPA-Fact-Sheet-USBC.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (stating that lactating women “are still 
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between carrying out their unique reproductive roles and advancing their careers 
or just keeping their jobs.133 
Although the cost of providing reasonable breastfeeding accommodations 
presents a legitimate concern for employers, many sources indicate that the cost 
is de minimus.134 At a minimum, lactation accommodation requires a private 
area,
135
 an electrical outlet for the breast pump, and a chair.136 Medical 
professionals confirm that refrigeration is not even necessary.137 Therefore, costs 
of accommodations for lactation do not often present a strong counterargument to 
requiring reasonable accommodations for lactation. 
2.  Fertility Treatments 
While the condition of infertility affects men and women, fertility treatments 
place a substantially higher burden on women, and consequently, impede their 
ability to continue full participation in the workforce.138 The law remains unclear 
regarding whether the PDA provides coverage for discrimination based on 
infertility treatments.139 In Hall v. Nalco,140 the court found that adverse 
 
vulnerable to being fired or discriminated against in the workplace”). 
133. This Comment does not argue that all employers must accommodate lactation even in spite of high 
costs or burdens. Rather, this section is included in order to illuminate the way in which women’s unique 
reproductive capacities may continue to interfere with equal employment opportunities despite the currently 
enacted federal laws. Therefore, enactment of a new federal law more specifically tailored to women’s unique 
reproductive capacities is required. 
134. Working It Out: Breastfeeding at Work, LA LECHE LEAGUE INT’L, http://www.llli.org/law/law 
employment.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Kathryn Tyler, How to 
Establish a Workplace Lactation Program, GOT MILK?, available at http://www.kathryntyler.com/got_ 
milk.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
135. Current law provides for privacy by requiring an employer to provide “a place, other than a 
bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used 
by an employee to express breast milk.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(1)(B). Thus, a small room or even a closet with a 
lock will suffice for smaller employers. See FACT SHEET #73: BREAK TIME FOR NURSING MOTHERS UNDER THE 
FLSA, U.S. DEP’T OF LAB. WAGE & HOUR DIV., available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/ 
whdfs73.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing further explanation 
of the room requirements for lactation accommodation). 
136. Tyler, supra note 134. 
137. Id. According to Marsha Walker, president of the International Lactation Consultant Association, 
“[y]ou don’t need refrigeration. You can put the milk in a cooler with blue ice packs and it will keep fine.” Id. 
138. See Male Infertility Overview, UP TO DATE, http://www.uptodate.com/contents/patient-
information-treatment-of-male-infertility (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(describing infertility treatments for men, assisted reproductive technologies (ART), the lack of risks to men 
versus the high risk and potentially life-threatening risks to women). 
139. See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the PDA did not 
“prohibit[] discrimination based solely on reproductive capacity”). The court distinguished between 
reproductive capacity and pregnancy or related conditions. Id. It further stated that even though surgical 
impregnation procedures apply only to women, the need for the procedure is traceable to both women and men. 
Id. at 346. Therefore, the PDA was inapplicable. Id. Compare Govori v. Goat Fifty, No. 10 Civ. 8982(DLC), 
2011 WL 1197942, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011), with Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 648• 49 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(both holding that discrimination based on in vitro fertilization treatments, not fertility alone, constitutes a valid 
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employment actions taken against Hall for her absences due to undergoing in 
vitro fertilization (IVF)141 constituted a valid cause of action under the PDA.142 
The court reasoned that “[e]mployees terminated for taking time off to undergo 
IVF—just like those terminated for taking time off to give birth or receive other 
pregnancy-related care—will always be women.”143 More specifically, IVF 
involves surgical impregnation, which can only be performed on women.144 Thus, 
by focusing on the plaintiff’s childbearing capacity—a condition specific to 
women—the court found discrimination on the basis of sex under Title VII.145 
In a similar case, Govori v. Goat Fifty, L.L.C.,146 the court followed Hall and 
found that women fired for undergoing IVF were discriminated against based on 
a medical condition related to pregnancy.147 The court cited Hall for the 
proposition that “only women undergo surgical implantation procedures; 
therefore, only women and not men stand in potential danger of being fired for 
missing work for these procedures.”148 Classifying surgical implantation 
procedures as “medical conditions related to pregnancy,”149 the court found that 
adverse employment actions for absences due to IVF constitute a cognizable 
action under the PDA.150 These two cases represent the idea that fertility 
treatments based on a woman’s reproductive capacity are protected by the 
PDA.151 
Other courts, however, hold that surgical impregnation procedures do not fall 
under the coverage of the PDA.152 For instance, in Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 
the Second Circuit stated “infertility standing alone does not fall within the 
meaning of the phrase ‘related medical conditions’ under the PDA.”153 “Because 
reproductive capacity is common to both men and women, we do not read the 
PDA as introducing a completely new classification of prohibited discrimination 
based solely on reproductive capacity.”154 Courts following this line of logic 
 
claim of sex-discrimination under the PDA). 
140. 534 F.3d at 648• 49. 
141. In vitro fertilization, or IVF, is a type of “assisted reproductive technology (ART)” by which 
“special medical techniques are used to help a woman become pregnant.” In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), MEDLINE 
PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/007279.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review). 
142. Hall, 534 F.3d at 649. 
143. Id. at 648• 49. 
144. Id. at 649. 
145. Id. at 648• 49. 
146. No. 10 Civ. 8982(DLC), 2011 WL 1197942 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011). 
147. Id. at *4. 
148. Id. at *3. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id.; Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008). 
152. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003). 
153. Id. 
154. Id. at 345. 
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reason that infertility affects both men and women and, thus, infertility is not a 
medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth for purposes of the PDA.155 
When looking at the different medical procedures required to address 
infertility in men and women, focusing on infertility alone provides too narrow 
an analysis. Although infertility affects both men and women,156 treating 
infertility poses more severe health risks for women and more physically 
demanding, time-consuming procedures.157 According to the Center for Disease 
Control and Prevention, “most cases [of] infertility [are] treated with drugs or 
surgery.”158 The fertility drugs159 administered to women require monitoring in the 
form of ultrasounds, blood estrogen levels, and urinary hormone testing.160 Many 
of these treatments also have variable responses for different women, so each 
patient’s treatment and monitoring regimens will differ.161 Some women 
experience mild side effects of fertility drugs, while others experience more 
severe complications.162 These different responses and monitoring necessities 
further demonstrate that discrimination based on a woman’s reproductive 
capacity does not fit into the comparator-based evaluation.163 
Women also undergo surgical procedures to address infertility. These 
procedures, known as assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs), include the 
IVF process.164 Risks of assisted reproductive techniques for women include, 
among other things, infection, damage to organs, and ovarian hyperstimulation 
syndrome, which may cause death.165 In addition, statistics indicate that women 
have higher infertility rates than men, which logically results in women 
undergoing fertility treatments more frequently.166 On the other hand, “there are 
 
155. La Porta v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 770–71 (W.D. Mich. 2001). 
156. It should be noted that men also undergo fertility treatments and procedures. See generally Male 
Infertility Overview, supra note 138. However, an examination of the discrimination men face based on this 
condition falls outside of the coverage of the PDA as well as the scope of this Comment. 
157. Male Infertility Overview, supra note 138. 
158. Infertility FAQ’s, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
reproductivehealth/Infertility/ (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
159. Such drugs include: Clomiphene Citrate, Human Menopausal Gonadotropin, Follicle Stimulating 
Hormone, and Human Chorionic Gonadotropin. Ovulation Induction, UCSF MED. CTR., http://www. 




162. See Fertility Drugs, WEBMD, http://www.webmd.com/infertility-and-reproduction/guide/fertility-
drugs?page=2 (last visited Jan. 9, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing side effects ranging 
from “headaches and dizziness to ovarian hyperstimulation and multiple pregnancy, which present health risks 
for both mother and child”). 
163. See Part IV.A (detailing the inadequacies of the comparator-based approach). 
164. See Infertility FAQ’s, supra note 158 (describing several types of ARTs, including in vitro 
fertilization).  
165. Id. 
166. See id. (explaining that infertility cases in developed countries consist of eight percent, which are 
traceable to male factors versus thirty-seven percent traceable to female factors. The other cases can be traced to 
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few to no risks [of ARTs] for men.”167 Men have a small chance of “bleeding, 
damage to the testes, and infection.”168 
If a woman must miss work to undergo fertility treatments or she experiences 
severe side effects from the procedures, an employer should not be permitted to 
take adverse employment actions against her based on her reproductive capacity. 
As detailed above, women disproportionately bear the burden of invasive 
physical procedures, time off of work to undergo treatment and monitoring, and 
risky health complications related to fertility treatments.169 All of these issues will 
almost certainly interfere with her ability to work. 
While the courts that follow the Hall and Govori line of reasoning recognize 
that a woman’s unique reproductive capacity affords her a remedy for 
discrimination based on fertility treatments such as IVF,170 courts that follow Saks 
do not recognize this protection.171 In order for women to be afforded truly equal 
employment opportunities, the laws related to women’s reproductive capacities 
must allow for accommodations in appropriate infertility situations. Recognizing 
that accommodations in certain infertility-related situations will afford equal 
employment opportunities can eliminate women having to choose between 
fulfilling their unique reproductive roles and maintaining employment. 
V. AN ACCOMMODATION APPROACH TO PREGNANCY 
Section A first explains the need for an accommodation approach by showing 
the inadequacy of the comparator-based method due to the wide-range of 
experiences even among pregnant women. Section A further explains the 
inapplicability of other laws such as the FMLA to the situations of many 
pregnant women, thus creating the need for an accommodation approach. Section 
B of this Part describes the ADA and Congress’s intent to alleviate the problems 
that this Comment is concerned with. This Section then explains the pregnancy-
related conditions, which would fall under the coverage of the ADA if such 
conditions were not caused by pregnancy. Finally, this Part concludes by 
proposing a new federal law, modeled after the ADA, to provide reasonable 
accommodations for pregnancy and related reproductive conditions.  
 
both female and male partners or the source of infertility cannot be determined). 
167. Male Infertility Overview, supra note 138. 
168. Id. 
169. See generally supra Part IV.B.2 (explaining in detail the disproportionate impact of fertility 
treatments on women as opposed to men). 
170. Hall v. Nalco, 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008); Govori v. Goat Fifty, L.L.C., No. 10 
CIV.8982(DLC), 2011 WL 1197942, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011). 
171. Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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A.  The Need for Accommodation 
Under an accommodation approach, employers must make reasonable 
accommodations based on the needs of the individual woman rather than 
considering whether accommodations are already being provided to similarly 
situated individuals.172 An accommodation approach, as opposed to a comparator-
based approach, is necessary to address the barriers to equal employment 
opportunities presented by women’s unique reproductive capacities. Under the 
current comparative approach of the PDA, an employer is only required to 
accommodate a woman for pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, 
if and to the extent that they already accommodate an employee who is “similarly 
situated” to the woman.173 
The main factor supporting an accommodation approach is that there is no 
similarly situated class—no men who will ever get pregnant. In addition, when a 
couple chooses to have a child, only a woman is able to get pregnant in order to 
fulfill that choice. Only women will experience disruptions to their ability to 
work as a result of pregnancy and their unique reproductive capacity. Even the 
“normal” pregnancies present some disruption to a woman’s ability to work. At 
the very least, a pregnant woman will experience hormonal changes, a growing 
abdomen, weight gain, breast changes, fetal movement, and increased blood 
volume.174 Other pregnancy side effects usually considered “normal” to a healthy 
pregnancy include: nausea, fatigue, increased urination, heartburn, headaches, 
mood swings, dizziness, leg cramps, shortness of breath, backaches, lifting 
restrictions, and swelling.175 
While these “normal”176 disruptive symptoms clearly interfere with a 
pregnant woman’s ability to perform at optimum work levels,177 even greater 
problems arise when a woman experiences side effects not typical to most 
pregnancies. Side effects such as depression, gestational diabetes, and severe, 
persistent nausea and vomiting178 undeniably infringe upon the woman’s ability to 
 
172. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B) (2006) (requiring reasonable accommodation under the ADA). 
173. See supra Part IV.A (detailing the comparative analysis under the PDA). 
174. Stages of Pregnancy, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-pregnant 
/stages-of-pregnancy.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
175. First Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/ 
health/pregnancy/PR00004 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Second 
Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pregnancy/PR00018 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Third Trimester Pregnancy: What to 
Expect, MAYO CLINIC, http://www.mayoclinic.com/health/pregnancy/PR00009 (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on 
file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
176. The term “normal” is used in this Comment to refer to pregnancy symptoms without medical 
complications. 
177. For example, the “normal” symptoms just listed may interfere with a woman’s level of alertness 
due to increased fatigue, she may require slightly more time away from her desk in order to use the restroom, or 
she may need to rest for a few minutes in order to catch her breath. 
178. Stages of Pregnancy, supra note 174. 
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work. Furthermore, female-specific reproductive concerns, outside the strict 
timeframe of gestation and birth, present additional concerns for women 
specifically because of their unique reproductive capacity.179 
The fact that pregnancy experiences and side effects vary even among 
members of the same class further supports the uniqueness of each individual 
case and indicates the inadequacy of the comparative method of evaluation. This 
wide-range of experiences makes the identification of an acceptable comparator 
impossible and explains why an accommodation approach is more appropriate to 
provide equal employment opportunities for women. Some women experience 
little-to-no problems, while others experience severely debilitating and, 
consequently, life-interfering conditions.180 For instance, ectopic pregnancies, in 
which the egg implants outside of the uterus, may require surgery to avoid organ 
damage.181 Another condition, hyperemesis gravidarum (HG), involves severe, 
persistent nausea and vomiting throughout the pregnancy.182 Women experiencing 
severe cases of HG may require hospitalization in order to “be fed fluids and 
nutrients through a tube in their veins.”183 
Although some may argue that a pregnant woman experiencing severe 
complications may use sick leave, vacation time, or take unpaid leave under the 
FMLA,184 these options may not apply to a substantial number of pregnant 
women.
185
 For example, if she experiences a complication throughout her entire 
pregnancy, she may not be entitled to enough sick days or vacation time under 
her employer’s policy in order to allow her to deal with her pregnancy 
complications.186 Similarly, under the FMLA, a woman must be employed for at 
least twelve months and at least 1,250 hours within the preceding twelve-month 
period in order to qualify for leave under the FMLA.187 The FMLA also does not 
 
179. See supra Part IV (providing more detailed explanation of these female-specific reproductive 
functions, such as breastfeeding and infertility treatments, and their interference with a woman’s ability to 
work). 
180. Stages of Pregnancy, supra note 174; Second Trimester Pregnancy: What to Expect, supra note 
175. 
181. Pregnancy Complications, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV, http://womenshealth.gov/pregnancy/you-are-
pregnant/pregnancy-complications.cfm (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). 
185. FMLA Facts and Statistics, AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, http://www.aauw.org/act/laf/library/fm 
lastatistics.cfm (last visited Mar. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The American Association 
of University Women indicates that about 40% of workers are not eligible to receive FMLA leave. Id.  
Concededly, it may not be possible to provide accommodations for all pregnant women due to the cost 
burdens imposed upon employers; the new proposed law attempts to reach a larger number while still 
recognizing the cost implications and burdens for employers. 
186. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). Under the FMLA, an eligible employee is only entitled to twelve 
workweeks of leave in a one-year period. Id. 
187. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(i). 
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apply to employers with less than fifty employees.188 Even if a pregnant woman 
qualifies for leave under the FMLA, she is only entitled to twelve-weeks of 
unpaid leave.189 The lack of pay presents additional challenges because this 
remedy assumes that the woman is financially able to take this extended period 
of unpaid leave.190  
B.  Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act191 
Because the PDA is ineffective and does not provide for reasonable 
accommodations, it is useful to look at how an accommodation model might 
work. The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)192 represents an existing legal 
structure for accommodating certain conditions, which demonstrates recognition 
of the unique obstacles to equal employment opportunities that certain conditions 
may present. Under the ADA, “discrimination” includes not reasonably 
accommodating known physical or mental limitations if the disabled employee 
(or applicant) is otherwise qualified for the job.193 The ADA does not require an 
employer to make reasonable accommodations for an individual if it can 
demonstrate that doing so would impose “undue hardship” on business 
operations.194 “Disability” is “a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; a record of such 
an impairment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.”195 
Although the ADA regulations specifically reject pregnancy as a disability,196 
analyzing the nature of pregnancy explains why an accommodation approach can 
work. Similar to conditions covered by the ADA, pregnancy often involves side 
effects that interfere with a woman’s ability to perform certain job functions.197 
 
188. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). 
189. Id. § 2612(a)(1), (c). 
190. See id. § 2612(c) (indicating the allowance of unpaid leave under the FMLA). 
191. While some may argue that pregnancy conditions should be accommodated under the ADA, this 
Comment proposes a new law to accommodate pregnancy because pregnancy should not be classified as a 
disability. Rather than classifying pregnancy as a disability, it should be viewed as the unique ability of women 
to bear children. Only women get pregnant and experience the unique conditions of reproductive capacity. As a 
class, women have overcome centuries of oppression and a long history of employment discrimination. Even 
today women have not yet fully achieved equal employment opportunities. Recognizing pregnancy and 
reproductive capacity as distinct from disabilities will ensure the continued efforts to equalize working women’s 
opportunities with respect to men in relation to their unique childbearing and reproductive capacities. But see 
Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as ‘Disability’ and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act, 53 B.C. L. REV. 
443 (2012) (arguing that the ADA should extend coverage to pregnant women because they experience 
conditions that are already accommodated under the ADA). 
192. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
193. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B). 
194. Id. 
195. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)–(B). 
196. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(h) (2011). 
197. See supra Part V.A.  
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ADA coverage extends to an impairment that “substantially limits one or more of 
[an individual’s] major life activities . . . .”198 Major life activities covered under 
the ADA, which are frequently associated with pregnancy and reproductive 
capacity, include: performing manual tasks, walking, and working.199 The ADA 
requires reasonable accommodations for such conditions if adjustments will 
permit the qualified employee to receive the “benefits and privileges of 
employment equal to those enjoyed by employees without disabilities.”200 
Women may experience impairments similar to those recognized under the ADA, 
on a temporary basis, as a result of pregnancy or inability to become pregnant, in 
the case of fertility treatments. Although their ability with respect to these tasks 
may be temporarily impaired, many pregnant women may continue to work at a 
competent level with reasonable accommodations. 
Further justification for accommodating pregnancy is found in the 
similarities between the effects of pregnancy discrimination and the problems the 
legislature sought to address with enacting the ADA.201 One of the main purposes 
for enacting the ADA was prohibiting discrimination. The Findings and Purpose 
states that discrimination “denies people with disabilities the opportunity to 
compete on an equal basis and to pursue those opportunities for which our free 
society is justifiably famous . . . .”202 In addition, statistics show that people with 
disabilities occupy an inferior status in society and are “socially, vocationally, 
economically, and educationally disadvantaged.”203 According to the United 
States Office of the Attorney General, accommodation is necessary because 
“integration is fundamental to the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act.”204 Accommodation provisions attempt to “prohibit exclusion and 
segregation of individuals with disabilities” and alleviate the denial of equal 
opportunities to these individuals.205 Without accommodations such as ramps or 
braille text, wheelchair users and blind individuals, respectively, are “relegate[d] 
. . . to second-class status.”206 
As demonstrated above, the ADA aims to address the very issue that this 
Comment is concerned with: achieving equal employment opportunities by 
providing accommodation for certain conditions. Unfortunately, the ADA 
 
198. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). 
199. See The ADA: Your Responsibilities as an Employer, U.S. EQUAL EMPL. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/ada17.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(providing examples of activities restricted by a disability that warrant accommodations under the ADA). 
200. Id. 
201. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (findings and purpose). 
202. Id.  
203. Id. § 12101(a)(6). 
204. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in State and Local Government Services, DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, available at http://www.ada.gov/reg2.html (last visited Mar. 4, 
2012) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
205. Id. 
206. Id. 
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regulations specifically reject pregnancy as a disability covered under the law.207 
While this Comment does not argue that pregnancy should be covered under the 
ADA, it is important to note that women discriminated against on the basis of 
pregnancy may not seek a cause of action under the ADA; therefore, the PDA 
provides the only current legal cause of action for women discriminated against 
on the basis of pregnancy.208 As previously explained, remedies under the PDA 
are ineffective.209 
Similar to the disabilities of individuals protected by the ADA,210 pregnancy 
and motherhood often interfere with women’s ability to compete equally with 
non-pregnant persons. For instance, in Troupe v. May Department Stores, Co., 
Troupe’s employer fired her for absences due to morning sickness even though 
she experienced abnormally severe effects of pregnancy and provided a doctor’s 
note.211 Troupe sued under the PDA, but failed.212 The court granted the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment, stating “[t]he Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act does not . . . require employers to offer maternity leave or 
take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work . . . to make it as 
easy, say as it is for their spouse to continue working during pregnancy.”213 The 
court further revealed the potential for discriminatory treatment of pregnant 
women under the PDA by stating that “[e]mployers can treat pregnant women as 
badly as they treat similarly affected but nonpregnant employees . . . .”214 
Troupe’s discrimination claim ultimately failed because of the comparator-
based analysis.215 She was unable to identify “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe”216 as 
tardy as she was, experiencing health problems that also required sick leave equal 
in length to her maternity leave, but who was not fired.217 Ms. Troupe likely could 
have kept her job and received employment opportunities equal to individuals not 
affected by pregnancy if her case had been evaluated under an accommodation 
standard.218 
 
207. 42 C.F.R. app § 1630.2(h) (2011). “Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not the result of a 
physiological disorder are also not impairments.” Id. 
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (providing that Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of or on the 
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”). 
209. See generally supra Part IV (detailing the insufficient protection of pregnant women under the 
PDA). 
210. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (findings and purpose). 
211. 20 F.3d 734, 735 (7th Cir. 1994). 
212. Id. at 739. 
213. Id. at 738 (citations omitted). 
214. Id. 
215. See id. (comparing the plaintiff’s situation to “a hypothetical Mr. Troupe”). 
216. See id. (discussing Ms. Troupe’s inability to show a “hypothetical Mr. Troupe” in order to apply 
the comparator-based approach). 
217. Id. 
218. See infra note 235 (applying an accommodation approach to Ms. Troupe’s situation). 
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C.  A New Federal Law Accommodating Pregnancy 
This Comment proposes a federal law requiring reasonable accommodation 
for women’s unique reproductive capacities. This approach closely follows 
current California law.219 Under current California law, “unless based upon a 
bona fide occupational qualification,”220 it is unlawful for employers to “refuse to 
provide reasonable accommodation for an employee for conditions related to 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, if she so requests, with the 
advice of her health care provider.”221 However, unlike the California law, the 
new law will replace the term “medical” with “reproductive,” thus requiring 
employers to provide reasonable accommodations related to pregnancy, 
childbirth, or a related reproductive condition. Deleting “medical” as a 
requirement provides broader coverage for women.222 It is necessary to delete the 
qualifier “medical” because many courts have interpreted this term narrowly, to 
the detriment of women pursuing a remedy under California’s law.223 For 
instance, in Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., the court explicitly stated that 
breastfeeding, although a “natural concomitant[] of pregnancy and childbirth, . . . 
[is] not [a] ‘medical condition[]’ related thereto.”224 The “related reproductive 
conditions” term is necessary because even “healthy” or “normal” pregnancies 
can interfere with a woman’s ability to work.225 “Related reproductive conditions” 
should include any condition that results from a woman’s unique reproductive 
capacity. For instance, breastfeeding and fertility treatments should receive 
coverage as a condition related to a woman’s reproductive capacity.226 The 
proposed law will keep the provision requiring the advice of a medical 
professional in order to mitigate the possibility of unnecessary accommodation 
requests. 
 
219. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12945 (West 2011). 
220. Id. § 12945. “Bona Fide Occupational Qualification” is defined as a practice of exclusion which is 
justified because “all or substantially all of the excluded individuals are unable to safely and efficiently perform 
the job in question and because the essence of the business operation would otherwise be undermined.” 2 CCR 
§ 7286.7(a) (2012). 
221. GOV’T § 12945(b)(3)(A). 
222. This broader coverage of women, admittedly, means that it also extends application to a larger 
number of employees. However, employers will be exempt from providing an accommodation if they can prove 
that it will cause undue hardship. 
223. See, e.g., Wallace v. Pyro Mining Co., 789 F. Supp. 867, 869 (W.D. Ky. 1990) (finding that 
breastfeeding is not a related medical condition); Williams v. MacFrugal’s Bargains-Close-Outs, Inc., 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 98 (Ct. App. 1998) (finding that a hysterectomy is not a related medical condition). 
224. Wallace, 789 F. Supp. at 869. 
225. See generally supra Part V.A (describing the normal symptoms of all pregnancies which may still 
prove disruptive to everyday life). 
226. See supra Part IV.B.1–2 (presenting arguments for insufficient coverage under current law for 
conditions outside the direct scope of pregnancy and gestation); see also Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 
337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (specifically stating that infertility “does not fall within the meaning of the phrase 
related medical conditions under the PDA”). 
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Similar to California, the statute’s use of “reasonable accommodations” may 
include “making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and 
usable by, individuals with disabilities,”227 or job restructuring, modified work 
schedules, reassignment, modifications to examinations, policies, and other 
similar adaptations for individuals experiencing pregnancy or conditions related 
to the unique female reproductive capacity.228 However, an employer is not 
required to provide reasonable accommodations if it can prove that doing so 
would cause undue hardship. This undue hardship shall be determined using a 
totality of the circumstances test,229 where the court balances factors including, 
“size, financial resources, nature, or structure of the employer’s business.”230 The 
employer will bear the burden of proving that providing the necessary 
accommodations would impose “significant difficulty or expense”231 in light of 
the factors. Since the size of the employer is one of the factors to consider, there 
will not be a minimum employee requirement for this law.232 Rather, the undue 
hardship element should provide adequate protection to small employers unable 
to bear the burden of providing the necessary accommodations while still 
maintaining a viable business.233 
In summary, the new proposed federal law will state: 
1. Unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, it is 
unlawful234 for an employer to refuse to provide reasonable 
accommodation for an employee who requests such accommodation, 
with the advice of her healthcare provider, for a condition related to: 
a. Pregnancy; 
b. Childbirth; or 
c. Other related reproductive conditions. 
 
227. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12926(n)(1) (West 2011). 
228. Id. § 12926(n)(2). 
229. Using a totality of the circumstances test provides a different and more comprehensive evaluation 
of whether an accommodation truly imposes an undue hardship than the previously referenced laws. See, e.g., 
29 U.S.C. § 207(r)(3) (Supp. IV 2011) (permitting any employer with less than fifty employees to attempt to 
raise an undue hardship defense to providing a break time for nursing mothers). 
230. Id. 
231. GOV’T § 12926(t). 
232. California excuses employers with less than five employees. Id. § 12926(d). While this limited 
application is an attempt to balance the cost burdens imposed upon employers, it is unnecessary to specify an 
arbitrary number of employees. Rather, the burden upon the employer to prove undue hardship suffices to show 
that the employer cannot withstand the cost burdens of providing accommodations. 
233. Restructuring the undue hardship element in this manner aims to ensure that only those employers 
whose businesses will be direly affected by such accommodations may be excused. 
234. This proposed law will provide a civil cause of action to employees who were wrongfully denied 
reasonable accommodations for pregnancy or related reproductive conditions. 
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2. An employer is not required to provide reasonable accommodations 
if the employer can prove that doing so would cause undue hardship 
based on the totality of the circumstances. 
Under this new law, the woman’s needs will be evaluated in conjunction with 
the employer’s ability to provide reasonable accommodations to fit these needs. 
If an employer is able to provide reasonable accommodations without 
experiencing an undue hardship, women should be allowed to continue 
productively contributing to the workforce and not be held back by their unique 
reproductive capacities.235 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Current federal law does not adequately address the barriers to equal 
employment opportunities that women face due to their unique reproductive 
capacities. Although the PDA is specifically designed to recognize women’s role 
in reproduction,236 it is limited in its coverage of a woman’s general reproductive 
capacity.237 Additionally, under the PDA’s structural framework, discrimination is 
judged by comparing the plaintiff’s situation to treatment of other similarly 
situated employees.238 This results in inadequate protection of women because 
there is no similarly situated class for purposes of comparison.239 Only women 
experience these unique conditions, and accommodations must be made in order 
for women as a class to receive equal employment opportunities.240 
Since the comparison approach does not provide sufficient protection for 
working women, an accommodation approach is necessary to adequately address 
this issue.241 This accommodation approach may be achieved through enacting a 
new federal law that requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations 
for pregnant employees as well as women affected by their reproductive capacity, 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related reproductive conditions.242 Under this new law, 
rather than comparing pregnant women to other “similarly situated” classes, 
 
235. If the Troupe court had applied this accommodation approach to Ms. Troupe’s case, she would not 
have been required to find a comparable male receiving better treatment. See Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores, Co., 
20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (requiring a comparable “Mr. Troupe”). Rather, her individual condition and 
accommodation requirements would be evaluated on their own merits. But cf. id. (applying a comparator 
analysis to plaintiff’s discrimination claim under the ADA). 
236. See Hunt-Golliday v. Metro. Water Reclamation Dist., 104 F.3d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act brought discrimination based on pregnancy within a woman’s protections against 
sex discrimination.”). 
237. See supra Part IV.B. 
238. See supra Part IV.A. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. 
241. See supra Part V.A. 
242. See supra Part V.C. 
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employers must consider the specific needs of these women on an individual 
basis in order to determine what types of accommodations are necessary.243 Until 
men can bear children, women must not bear the costs that their unique 
reproductive capacity imposes upon their ability to achieve equal employment 
opportunities. 
 
 
243. Id. 
